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Simplicity-Expressiveness Tradeoffs in Mechanism Design
Paul Du¨tting∗ Felix Fischer† David C. Parkes‡
Everything should be made as simple as possible, but no simpler.
– Albert Einstein
Abstract
A fundamental result in mechanism design theory, the so-called revelation princi-
ple, asserts that for many questions concerning the existence of mechanisms with a
given outcome one can restrict attention to truthful direct revelation-mechanisms. In
practice, however, many mechanism use a restricted message space. This motivates
the study of the tradeoffs involved in choosing simplified mechanisms, which can some-
times bring benefits in precluding bad or promoting good equilibria, and other times
impose costs on welfare and revenue. We study the simplicity-expressiveness tradeoff
in two representative settings, sponsored search auctions and combinatorial auctions,
each being a canonical example for complete information and incomplete information
analysis, respectively. We observe that the amount of information available to the
agents plays an important role for the tradeoff between simplicity and expressiveness.
1 Introduction
A fundamental result in mechanism design theory, the so-called revelation principle, asserts
that for many questions concerning the existence of mechanisms with a given outcome
one can restrict attention to truthful direct-revelation mechanisms, i.e., mechanisms in
which agents truthfully reveal their type by stating it directly. In practice, however, the
assumptions underlying the revelation principle often fail: other equilibria may exist besides
the truthful one, or computational limitations may interfere. As a consequence, many
practical mechanisms use a restricted message space. This motivates the study of the
tradeoffs involved in choosing among mechanisms with different degrees of expressiveness.
Despite their practical importance, these tradeoffs are currently only poorly understood.
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In sponsored search auctions, and adopting a complete information analysis, allowing
every agent i to submit a valuation vij for each slot j means that both the Vickrey-Clarke-
Groves (VCG) mechanism and the Generalized Second Price (GSP) mechanism always
admit a Nash equilibrium with zero revenue [22]. If agents face a small cost for submitting
a non-zero bid, this becomes the unique equilibrium. If instead agent i is asked for a single
bid bi, and his bid for slot j is derived by multiplying it with a slot-specific click-through
rate αj , the zero-revenue equilibria are eliminated. More surprisingly, this simplification
does not introduce new equilibria (even when αj is not correct for every agent i), so
minimum revenue over all Nash equilibria is strictly greater for the simplification than
for the original mechanism. Moreover, if valuations can actually be decomposed into an
agent-specific valuation vi and click-through rates αj , the simplification still has an efficient
Nash equilibrium. Milgrom [22] concluded that simplification can be beneficial and need
not come at a cost.
For combinatorial auctions, and adopting an incomplete information analysis, the maxi-
mum social welfare over all outcomes of a mechanism strictly increases with expressiveness,
for a particular measure of expressiveness based on notions from computational learning
theory [4]. Implicit in the result of Benisch et al. [4] is the conclusion that more expressive-
ness is generally desirable, as it allows a mechanism to achieve a more efficient outcome in
more instances of the problem.
Each of these results tells only part of the story. While Milgrom’s results on the ben-
efits of simplicity are developed within an equilibrium framework and can be extended
beyond sponsored search auctions, they critically require settings with complete informa-
tion amongst agents in order to preclude bad equilibria while retaining good ones. In
particular, Milgrom does not consider the potential loss in efficiency or revenue that can
occur when agents are ignorant of each other’s valuations when deciding how to bid within
a simplified bidding language. Benisch et al., on the other hand, develop their results on
the benefits of expressiveness (and thus the cost of simplicity) in an incomplete informa-
tion context, but largely in the absence of equilibrium considerations.1 In particular, these
authors do not consider the potential problems that can occur due to the existence of bad
equilibria in expressive mechanisms.
Our Contribution The contribution of this paper is twofold. On a conceptual level,
we analyze how different properties of a simplification affect the set of equilibria of a
mechanism in both complete and incomplete information settings and argue that well-
chosen simplifications can have a positive impact on the set of equilibria as a whole; either
by precluding undesirable equilibria or by promoting desirable equilibria. We thus extend
Milgrom’s emphasis on simplification as a tool that enables equilibrium selection. On
1The equilibrium analysis that Benisch et al. provide is in regard to identifying a particular mechanism
design in which the maximum social welfare achievable in any outcome can be achieved in a particular
Bayes-Nash equilibrium.
2
a technical level, we analyze simplified mechanisms for sponsored search auctions with
complete information and combinatorial auctions with incomplete information.
An important property when analyzing the impact of simplification on the set of equi-
libria is tightness [22], which requires that no additional equilibria are introduced. We
observe that tightness can be achieved equally well in complete and incomplete informa-
tion settings and give a sufficient condition.2 Complementary to tightness is a property
we call totality, which requires all equilibria of the original mechanism to be preserved. To
the end of equilibrium selection, totality needs to be relaxed. Particular relaxations we
consider in this paper are the preservation of the VCG outcome, i.e., the outcome obtained
in the dominant strategy equilibrium of the fully expressive VCG mechanism, and the
existence of an equilibrium with a certain amount of social welfare or revenue relative to
the VCG outcome. In addition, one might require that the latter property holds for every
equilibrium of the simplified mechanism.
In the context of sponsored search, one reason to prefer a simplification is to preclude
the zero revenue equilibrium discussed above. Another interesting property of a simplified
GSP mechanism is that it preserves the VCG outcome even when the assumed click-through
rates αj are inexact. Recognizing that this claim cannot be made for the VCG mechanism
under the same simplification, Milgrom [22] uses this as an argument for the superiority of
the GSP mechanism. But, this result that GSP is Vickrey-preserving requires an unnatural
condition on the relationship between the assumed click-through rates and prices and thus
agents’ bids, and moreover does not preclude alternate simplifications of VCG that succeed
in being Vickrey-preserving. In addition, we observe that the simplifications can still suffer
arbitrarily low revenue in some equilibrium, in comparison with the VCG revenue. In our
results on sponsored search, we identify a simplified GSP mechanism that preserves the
VCG outcome without requiring any knowledge of the actual click-through rates, precludes
zero revenue equilibrium, and always recovers at least half of the VCG payments for all
slots but the first. For simplified VCG mechanisms, we obtain a strong negative result:
every simplification of VCG that supports the (efficient) VCG outcome in some equilibrium
also has an equilibrium in which revenue is arbitrarily smaller than in the VCG outcome.
In the context of combinatorial auctions, paradigmatic of course of settings with in-
complete information, we first recall the previous observations by Holzman et al. [15, 16]
in regard to the existence of multiple, non-truthful, ex post Nash equilibria of the VCG
mechanism, each of which offers different welfare and revenue properties. In particular, if
one assumes that participants will select equilibria with a particular (maximum) number
of bids, social welfare can differ greatly among the different equilibria, revenue can be zero
for some of them, and the existence of multiple Pareto optimal equilibria can make equilib-
rium selection for participants hard to impossible. Focusing again on tight simplifications,
we connect the analysis of Holzman et al. [15, 16] with tightness, by establishing that a
simplification is tight if and only if bids are restricted to a subset Σ of the bundles with
2This condition was already considered by Milgrom, but only in the complete information case.
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a quasi-field structure [15, 16], with values for the other bundles derived as the maximum
value of any contained bundle. Through insisting on a tight simplification, we ensure that
the worst-case behavior is no worse than that of the fully expressive VCG mechanism, even
when Σ (although simplified) contains too many bundles for agents to bid on all of them.
Moreover, using a quasi-field simplification ensures that agents do not experience regret
with respect to the bidding language, in the sense of wanting to send a message ex post that
was precluded. Finally, as any restriction of the bids to a subset of the bundles, restricting
the bids to a quasi-field Σ makes it a dominant strategy equilibrium for the agents to bid
truthfully on these bundles. Simplification thus enables the mechanism designer to guide
equilibrium selection, and our results suggest that the presence or absence of such guidance
can have a significant impact on the economic properties of the mechanism.
The informational assumptions underlying our analysis are crucial, and the amount
of information available to the agents plays an important role for the tradeoff between
simplicity and expressiveness. In the sponsored search setting, both the existence of a
zero-revenue equilibrium in the expressive mechanism, and the existence of the desirable
equilibrium in the simplification, rely on the assumption of complete information. In other
words, agents can on one hand use information about each others’ types to coordinate
and harm the auctioneer, but on the other hand, the same information guarantees that
simplified mechanisms retain the desirable equilibria of the expressive mechanism. In
combinatorial auctions the contrast is equally stark: while bids on every single package
may be required to sustain an efficient equilibrium in the incomplete information setting,
we show that such an equilibrium can be obtained with a number of bids that is quadratic
in the number of agents, and potentially exponentially smaller than the number of bundles,
given that agents have complete information.
Related Work Several authors have criticized the revelation principle because it does
not take computational aspects of mechanisms into account. In this context, Conitzer and
Sandholm [10] consider sequential mechanisms that reduce the amount of communication,
and non-truthful mechanisms that shift the computational burden of executing the mech-
anism, and the potential loss when it is executed suboptimally, from the designer to the
agents. Hyafil and Boutilier [17, 18] propose to circumvent computational problems associ-
ated with direct type revelation via the automated design of partial-revelation mechanisms,
and in particular study approximately incentive compatible mechanisms that do not make
any assumptions about agents’ preferences. This approach is very general, but also hard
to analyze theoretically, with complex, regret-based algorithms.
Blumrosen et al. [6] and Feldman and Blumrosen [12] consider settings with one-
dimensional types and ask how much welfare and revenue can be achieved by mechanisms
with a bounded message space. By contrast, we study mechanisms with message spaces
that grow in some parameter of the problem and may even have infinite size, and obtain
results both for one-dimensional and multi-dimensional types.
A different notion of simplicity of a mechanism was considered by Babaioff and Rough-
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garden [3]: the authors show that among all payment rules that guarantee an efficient
equilibrium when ranking agents according to their bids, the GSP payment rule is opti-
mally simple in the sense that prices depend on bids in a minimal way.
Shakkottai et al. [25] study the tradeoff between simplicity and revenue in the context
of pricing rules for communication networks and define the “price of simplicity” as the
ratio between the revenue of a very simple pricing rule and the maximum revenue that can
be obtained.
2 Preliminaries
A mechanism design problem is given by a set N = {1, 2, . . . , n} of agents that interact
to select an element from a set Ω of outcomes. Agent i ∈ N is associated with a type θi
from a set Θi of possible types, representing private information held by this agent. We
write θ = (θ1, θ2, . . . , θn) for a profile of types for the different agents, Θ =
∏
i∈N Θi for
the set of possible type profiles, and θ−i ∈ Θ−i for a profile of types for all agents but i.
Each agent i ∈ N further employs preferences over Ω, represented by a valuation function
vi : Ω × Θi → R. The quality of an outcome o ∈ Ω is typically measured in terms of its
social welfare, which is defined as the sum
∑
i∈N vi(o, θi) of agents’ valuations. An outcome
that maximizes social welfare is also called efficient.
A mechanism is given by a tuple (N,X, f, p), where X =
∏
i∈N Xi is a set of message
profiles, f : X → Ω is a social choice function, and p : X → Rn is a payment function. In
this paper, we mostly restrict our attention to direct mechanisms, i.e., mechanisms where
Xi ⊆ Θi for every i ∈ N . A direct mechanism (N,X, f, p) with X = Θ is called efficient if
for every θ ∈ Θ, f(θ) is an efficient outcome. Just as for type profiles, we write x−i ∈ X−i
for a profile of messages by all agents but i. We assume quasilinear preferences, i.e., the
utility of agent i given a message profile x ∈ X is ui(x, θi) = vi(f(x), θi) − pi(x). The
revenue achieved by mechanism (N,X, f, p) for a message profile x ∈ X is ∑i∈N pi(x).
Game-theoretic reasoning is used to analyze how agents interact with a mechanism, a
desirable criterion being stability according to some game-theoretic solution concept. We
consider two different settings. In the complete information setting, agents are assumed
to know the type of every other agent. A strategy of agent i in this setting is a function
si : Θ → Xi. In the (strict) incomplete information setting, agents have no information,
not even distributional, about the types of the other agents. A strategy of agent i in this
setting thus becomes a function si : Θi → Xi.
The two most common solution concepts in the complete information setting are dom-
inant strategy equilibrium and Nash equilibrium. A strategy si : Θ → Xi is a dominant
strategy if for every θ ∈ Θ, every x−i ∈ X−i, and every xi ∈ Xi,
ui((si(θ), x−i), θi) ≥ ui((xi, x−i), θi).
A profile s ∈ ∏i∈N si of strategies si : Θ → Xi is a Nash equilibrium if for every θ ∈ Θ,
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every i ∈ N , and every s′i : Θ→ Xi,
ui((si(θ), s−i(θ)), θi) ≥ ui((s′i(θ), s−i(θ)), θi).
The existence of a dominant strategy si : Θ → Xi always implies the existence of a
dominant strategy s′i : Θi → Xi that does not depend on the types of other agents.
The solution concept of dominant strategy equilibrium thus carries over directly to the
incomplete information setting. Formally, a strategy si : Θi → Xi is a dominant strategy
in the incomplete information setting if for every θi ∈ Θi, every x−i ∈ X−i, and every
xi ∈ Xi,
ui((si(θi), x−i), θi) ≥ ui((xi, x−i), θi).
The appropriate variant of the Nash equilibrium concept in that setting is that of an ex-
post equilibrium. A profile s ∈∏i∈N si of strategies si : Θi → Xi is an ex-post equilibrium
if for every θ ∈ Θ, every i ∈ N , and every s′i : Θi → Xi,
ui((si(θi), s−i(θ−i)), θi) ≥ ui((s′i(θi), s−i(θ−i)), θi).
We conclude this section with a direct mechanism due to Vickrey [27], Clarke [9], and
Groves [14]. This mechanism starts from an efficient social choice function f and computes
each agent’s payment according to the total value of the other agents, thus aligning his
interests with that of society. Formally, mechanism (N,X, f, p) is called Vickrey-Clarke-
Groves (VCG) mechanism3 if X = Θ, f is efficient, and
pi(θ) = max
o∈Ω
∑
j 6=i
vj(o, θj)−
∑
j 6=i
vj(f(θ), θj).
In the VCG mechanism, revealing types θ ∈ Θ truthfully is a dominant strategy equilib-
rium [14]. We will refer to the resulting outcome as the VCG outcome for θ, and write
R(θ) for the revenue obtained in this outcome.
3 Simplifications
Our main object of study in this paper are simplifications of a mechanism obtained by
restricting its message space. Consider a mechanism M = (N,X, f, p). A mechanism
Mˆ = (N, Xˆ, fˆ , pˆ) will be called a simplification of M if Xˆ ⊆ X, fˆ |
Xˆ
= f |
Xˆ
, and pˆ|
Xˆ
= p|
Xˆ
.
We will naturally be interested in the set of outcomes that can be obtained in equi-
librium, both in the original mechanism M and the simplified mechanism Mˆ .4 Milgrom
3Actually, we consider a specific member of a whole family of VCG mechanisms, namely the one that
uses the Clarke pivot rule.
4In the following, we will simply talk about equilibria without making a distinction between the different
equilibrium notions. Unless explicitly noted otherwise, our results concern Nash equilibria in the complete
information case and ex-post equilibria in the incomplete information case.
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[22] defines a property he calls tightness, which requires that the simplification does not
introduce any additional equilibria. More formally, simplification Mˆ will be called tight
if every equilibrium of Mˆ is an equilibrium of M .5 Tightness ensures that the simplified
mechanism is at least as good as the original one with respect to the worst outcome ob-
tained in any equilibrium. It does not by itself protect good equilibrium outcomes, and we
will in fact see examples of tight simplifications that eliminate all ex-post equilibria.
A property that will be useful in the following is a variant of Milgrom’s outcome closure
for exact equilibria. It requires that for every agent, and for every choice of messages from
the restricted message sets of the other agents, it is optimal for the agent to choose a
message from his restricted message set. More formally, a simplification (N, Xˆ, fˆ , pˆ) of a
mechanism (N,X, f, p) satisfies outcome closure if for every θ ∈ Θ, every i ∈ N , every xˆ−i ∈
Xˆ−i, and every xi ∈ Xi there exists xˆi ∈ Xˆi such that ui((xˆi, xˆ−i), θi) ≥ ui((xi, xˆ−i), θi).
This turns out to be sufficient for tightness in both the complete and incomplete infor-
mation case.6
Proposition 1 (Milgrom [22]). Every simplification that satisfies outcome closure is tight
with respect to both Nash and ex-post Nash equilibria.
Proof. Fix θ ∈ Θ. Consider a mechanism M = (N,X, f, p), a simplification Mˆ =
(N, Xˆ, fˆ , pˆ) that satisfies outcome closure, and a Nash equilibrium xˆ of Mˆ . Assume for
contradiction that xˆ is not a Nash equilibrium of M . Then, for some i ∈ N , there ex-
ists x′i ∈ Xi such that ui((x′i, xˆ−i), θi) > ui(xˆ, θi). Since Mˆ satisfies outcome closure,
there further exists xˆ′i ∈ Xˆi such that ui((xˆ′i, xˆ−i), θi) ≥ ui((x′i, xˆ−i), θi). It follows that
ui((xˆ
′
i, xˆ−i), θi) > ui(xˆ, θi), which contradicts the assumption that xˆ is a Nash equilibrium
of Mˆ .
One way to guarantee good behavior in the best case is by requiring that a simplification
Mˆ preserves all equilibria of the original mechanism M , in the sense that for every Nash
equilibrium of M , there exists an equilibrium of Mˆ that yields the same outcome and
payments. We will call a simplification satisfying this property total, and will return
to total mechanisms in Section 6. To the end of equilibrium selection totality clearly
needs to be relaxed, by requiring that only certain desirable outcomes are preserved. A
typical desirable outcome in many settings is the VCG outcome. For example, although
this outcome has some shortcomings in fully general combinatorial auction domains [2], it
remains of significant interest in settings with unit-demand preferences, such as sponsored
search. We will call simplification Mˆ Vickrey-preserving if for every θ ∈ Θ, it has an
equilibrium that yields the VCG outcome for θ.
5Milgrom [22] considers a slightly stronger notion of tightness defined with respect to (pure-strategy)
ǫ-Nash equilibria.
6Milgrom stated the result only for complete information, but the proof goes through for incomplete
information as well.
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4 Sponsored Search Auctions
In sponsored search (see, e.g., [20]), the agents compete for elements of a set S = {1, . . . , k}
of slots, where k ≤ n. Each outcome corresponds to a one-to-one assignment of agents to
slots, i.e., Ω ⊆ {1, . . . , n}N such that oi 6= oj for all o ∈ Ω and i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n} with
i 6= j. We will assume that v(o, θi) = 0 if oi > k, and that there are no externalities, i.e.,
vi(o, θi) = vi(o
′, θi) if oi = o
′
i. In slight abuse of notation, we will write vi(j, θi) for the
valuation of agent i for slot j.
We consider simplifications of two mechanisms, the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG)
mechanism and the Generalized Second Price (GSP) mechanism, and analyze their be-
havior for different spaces of type profiles, which we denote by Θ, Θ>, and Θα. In Θ,
valuations can be arbitrary non-negative numbers. Θ> adds the restriction that valua-
tions are strictly decreasing, i.e., vi(j, θi) > vi(j + 1, θi) for every θ ∈ Θ>, i ∈ N , and
j ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}. Valuations in Θα are assumed to arise from “clicks” associated with
each slot and a valuation per click. In other words, there exists a fixed click-through rate
vector α ∈ Rn> = {α′ ∈ Rn : α′i > αj if i < j}, which may or may not be known to the
mechanism, and vi(j, θi) = αj · vi(θi) for some vi(θi) ∈ R≥0. Thus, αj = 0 if j > k, and it
will be convenient to assume that α1 = 1. We finally define Ψ =
⋃
α∈Rn>
Θα, and observe
that Ψ ⊂ Θ> ⊂ Θ.
The message an agent i ∈ N submits to the mechanisms thus corresponds to a vector
of bids xi,j ∈ R for slots j ∈ S. Given a message profile x ∈ X, the VCG mechanism
assigns each agent i a slot fi(x) = oi so as to maximize
∑
i xi,oi , and charges that agent
pi(x) = maxo′∈Ω
∑
j 6=i xj,o′j −
∑
j 6=i xj,oj . The GSP mechanism is defined via a sequence
of second-price auctions for slots 1 through k: slot j is assigned to an agent i with a
maximum bid for that slot at a price equal to the second highest bid, both with respect
to the set of agents who have not yet been assigned a slot, i.e., fi(x) = oi such that
xi,j = maxi′∈N :oi′≥j xi′,j and pi(x) = maxi′∈N :oi′>j xi,j.
4.1 Envy-Freeness and Efficiency
The original analysis of GSP due to Edelman et al. [11] and Varian [26] focuses on equilibria
that are “locally envy-free.”7 Assume that θ ∈ Θα, and consider an outcome in which
agent i is assigned to slot i, for all i ∈ N . Such an outcome is called locally envy-free if,
in addition to being a Nash equilibrium, no agent could increase his utility by exchanging
bids with the agent assigned the slot directly above him, i.e., if for every i ∈ {2, . . . , n},
αi · vi − pi ≥ αi−1 · vi − pi−1. Restricting attention to envy-free equilibria immediately
solves all revenue problems: as Edelman et al. point out, revenue in any locally envy-free
equilibrium is at least as high as that in the dominant-strategy equilibrium of the VCG
auction. Conversely, Milgrom’s observation concerning zero-revenue equilibria contains
7Varian calls these equilibria “symmetric equilibria.”
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an implicit critique of the assumptions underlying the restriction to equilibria that are
envy-free. It will be instructive to make this critique explicit.
Edelman et al. argue that an equilibrium where some agent i envies some other agent j
assigned the next higher slot is not a reasonable rest point of the bidding process, because
agent i might increase the price paid by agent j without the danger of harming his own
utility should j retaliate. There are two problems with this line of reasoning. First, it is
not clear why agent j should retaliate, especially if he is worse off by doing so. Second,
agent i might in fact have a very good reason not to increase the price paid by j, like a
desire to keep prices low in the long run through tacit collusion.
We consider a weaker refinement of Nash equilibrium, by asking under what conditions
there exists a bid bi for agent i such that (i) agent j is forced out of the higher slot, in
the sense that it becomes a better response for j to underbid i, and (ii) agent i is strictly
better off after this response by j than at present. This is the case exactly when
αi · vj − pi > αj · vj − bi and αj · vi − bi > αi · vi − pi,
where pi is the price currently paid by agent i. The second inequality assumes that j will
respond by bidding just below the bid bi of agent i, such that this becomes i’s new price.
Rewriting, this deviation is possible when
bi > (αj − αi) · vj + pi and bi < (αj − αi) · vi + pi.
Clearly, a bid bi with this property exists if and only if vi > vj . In turn, agents i and j
such that i = j + 1 and vi > vj exist if and only if the current assignment is inefficient.
This provides a very strong argument against inefficient equilibria as rest points of the
bidding process, much stronger than the argument against equilibria that are not envy-
free. In the context of sponsored search auctions we will therefore restrict our attention to
efficient equilibria. It is worth noting at this point that the set of efficient equilibria forms
a strict superset of the set of locally envy-free equilibria, and in particular contains the
zero-revenue equilibria identified by Milgrom and discussed next.
4.2 Comments on Milgrom’s Analysis
Milgrom [22] observed that for every profile of agent types, both VCG and GSP have a
Nash equilibrium that yields zero revenue, and that this equilibrium in fact becomes the
unique equilibrium if there is a small cost associated with submitting a positive bid. To
alleviate this fact, he proposed to restrict the message space of both VCG and GSP to
Xˆ = {(α1 · bi, . . . , αk · bi) : bi ∈ R≥0} for some α ∈ Rn>.
The following proposition summarizes our knowledge about the resulting simplifica-
tions, which we will refer to as α-VCG and α-GSP. Most of these observations were al-
ready proved or at least claimed by Milgrom, but a proof of the proposition is given in
Appendix A for the sake of completeness.
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Proposition 2. Let α ∈ Rn>. Then, α-GSP and α-VCG are tight on Θ, have positive
revenue on Θ> if n, k ≥ 2, and are Vickrey-preserving on Θα.
Assuming that the click-through rate vector α is known, both α-VCG and α-GSP look
very appealing: they eliminate all zero-revenue equilibria, without affecting the truthful
equilibrium and without introducing any new equilibria.
In practice, however, the relevant click-through rate may not be known. A somewhat
more realistic model assumes a certain degree of heterogeneity among the population gen-
erating the clicks. More precisely, a certain fraction of this population is assumed to be
“merely curious,” such that clicks by this part of the population do not generate any value
for the agents. This introduces an information asymmetry, where the mechanism observes
the overall click-through rate vector α, while agents derive value from a different click-
through rate vector β.8 In the following we will assume that β is the same for all agents,
and that β is again normalized such that β1 = 1 and βj = 0 if j > k.
For a slight variation of our model, in which there is a small dependence between α and
β,9 Milgrom established a separation between GSP and VCG: α-GSP retains the VCG
outcome while α-VCG fails. We obtain an analogous observation in our model. First,
α-GSP is Vickrey-preserving, as we prove in Appendix B.
Proposition 3. Let α, β ∈ Rn>. Then, α-GSP is Vickrey-preserving on Θβ if and only if
the sequence {pj(θ)/αj}j=1,...,k, where pj(θ) =
∑k
i=j(vi+1(θi+1) · (βi−βi+1)), is decreasing.
Second, we establish in Appendix C that α-VCG is not Vickrey-preserving. But this
line of reasoning seems a bit problematic for two reasons. First, there seems no reason
to believe that the condition relating prices (and thus bids) and click-through rates in
Proposition 3 would be satisfied in practice. Second, the above discussion only shows
superiority of GSP over VCG with respect to a particular simplification, and it might well
be the case that there exists a different simplification of VCG mechanism with comparable
or even better properties.
An additional observation that we make, in regard to the ability of these simplifications
to eliminate zero-revenue equilibria, is that there exist type profiles for which the minimum
equilibrium revenue can be arbitrarily small compared to the revenue obtained in the VCG
outcome.
Theorem 1. Let ǫ, r > 0. Then there exist α ∈ Rn> and θ ∈ Θα such that R(θ) ≥ r
and α-VCG has an equilibrium with revenue at most ǫ. Similarly, there exist α ∈ Rn> and
θ ∈ Θα such that R(θ) ≥ r and α-GSP has an equilibrium with revenue at most ǫ.
8As Milgrom points out, even the most sophisticated machine learning techniques might not be able to
predict the click-through rates from which agents actually derive value.
9Milgrom assumes that there is a fraction λ of shoppers with click-through rate vector α and a fraction
(1− λ) of curious searchers with click-through rate vector β. The click-through rate vector γ observed by
the search provider is then given by γj = λ · αj + (1− λ) · βj .
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Proof. We consider a setting with three agents and three slots. The construction can easily
be extended to an arbitrary number of agents and slots.
For α-VCG, let vi(θi) = r + 1 for all i ∈ N . Let α1 = 1, α2 = 1/(r + 1), and
α3 = 1/(2r + 2). It is easily verified that the bids b1 = r + 1 and b2 = b3 = ǫ form a
Nash equilibrium of α-VCG. Given these bids, α-VCG assigns slot 1 to agent 1 at price
ǫ− ǫ/(2r+2), and slots 2 and 3 to agents 2 and 3 at prices ǫ/(r+1)− ǫ/(2r+2) and zero.
This yields revenue ǫ. In the truthful equilibrium of the VCG mechanism, on the other
hand, the price is r+ ǫ/(r+ 1)− ǫ/(2r + 2) for the first slot, ǫ/(r+ 1)− ǫ/(2r + 2) for the
second slot, and zero for the third slot, for an overall revenue of r + ǫ/(r + 2).
For α-GSP, again let vi(θi) = r + 1 for all i ∈ N . Let δ = ǫ/(r + 2), α1 = 1,
α2 = (1 + δ)/(r + 1), and α3 = 1/(r + 1). It is easily verified that the bids b1 = r + 1 and
b2 = b3 = δ/(1 + δ) · (r + 1) form a Nash equilibrium of α-GSP. Given these bids, α-GSP
assigns slot 1 to agent 1 at price δ/(1 + δ) · (r + 1), and slots 2 and 3 to agents 2 and 3 at
prices δ and zero. This yields revenue δ/(1+ δ) · (r+1)+ δ ≤ ǫ. In the truthful equilibrium
of the VCG mechanism, on the other hand, the price is r for the first slot, δ for the second
slot, and zero for the third slot, for an overall revenue of r + δ.
4.3 A Sense in which GSP is Superior to VCG
The above observations raise the following prominent question: does there exist a sim-
plification that preserves the VCG outcome despite ignorance about the true click-through
rates that affect bidders’ values, and if so, can this simplification achieve improved revenue
relative to the VCG outcome, in every equilibrium?
For GSP the answer is surprisingly simple: a closer look at the proofs of Proposition 2
and Proposition 3 reveals that by ignoring the observed click-through rates α, and setting
α = 1 = (1, . . . , 1) instead, one obtains a simplification that is tight, guarantees positive
revenue, and is Vickrey-preserving on all of Ψ. This strengthens Proposition 2 over the
claims for α-GSP and α-VCG.
Corollary 1. α-GSP is tight on Ψ, has positive revenue on Ψ if n, k ≥ 2, and is Vickrey-
preserving on Ψ, if and only if α = 1 = (1, . . . , 1).
The direction from left to right follows by observing that, for every α 6= 1, we can find
a β such that the condition of Proposition 3 is violated.
In light of Theorem 1, and given the arguments in favor of efficient equilibria, we may
further ask for the minimum revenue obtained by 1-GSP in any efficient equilibrium. It
turns out that with the exception of the first slot, 1-GSP always recovers at least half of
the VCG revenue.
Theorem 2. Let β ∈ Rn>, θ ∈ Θβ. Then, every efficient equilibrium of 1-GSP for θ yields
revenue at least
1
2

R(θ)− k∑
j=1
(βj − βj+1) · vj+1(θj+1)

 .
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Proof. Assume that agents are ordered such that v1(θ1) ≥ · · · ≥ vn(θn) and consider a
bid profile b(θ) corresponding to an efficient equilibrium of 1-GSP. It then holds that
b1(θ) ≥ · · · ≥ bn(θ), and for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, 1-GSP assigns slot i to agent i at price
pi(θ) = bi+1(θ). A necessary condition for b(θ) to be an equilibrium is that for every agent
j ∈ N , bj(θ) is large enough such that none of the agents i > j would prefer being assigned
slot j instead of i. In particular, for every i ∈ N ,
βi+1 · vi+1(θi+1)− pi+1(θ) ≥ βi · vi+1(θi+1)− bi(θ) and
βi+2 · vi+2(θi+2)− pi+2(θ) ≥ βi · vi+2(θi+2)− bi(θ).
Since pi(θ) = bi+1(θ) and by rearranging,
bi(θ) ≥ (βi − βi+1) · vi+1(θi+1) + pi+1(θ) = (βi − βi+1) · vi+1(θi+1) + bi+2(θ) and
bi(θ) ≥ (βi − βi+2) · vi+2(θi+2) + pi+2(θ) ≥ (βi+1 − βi+2) · vi+2(θi+2) + bi+3(θ).
If we repeatedly substitute according to the first inequality, we obtain
bi(θ) ≥
⌊ k−i
2
⌋∑
j=1
(βi+2·j−2 − βi+2·j−1) · vi+2·j−1(θi+2·j−1) and
bi(θ) ≥
⌊ k−i
2
⌋∑
j=1
(βi+2·j−1 − βi+2·j) · vi+2·j(θi+2·j).
By adding the two inequalities,
2 · bi(θ) ≥
k∑
j=i
(βj − βj+1) · vj+1(θj+1),
and, since pi(θ) = bi+1(θ),
2 · pi(θ) ≥
k∑
j=i+1
(βj − βj+1) · vj+1(θj+1).
Now recall that R(θ) =
∑
i∈N ri(θ), where
ri(θ) =
k∑
j=i
(βj − βj+1) · vj+1(θj+1).
Thus, ∑
i∈N
2 · pi(θ) ≥
∑
i∈N
ri(θ)−
k∑
j=1
(βj − βj+1) · vj+1(θj+1).
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The revenue obtained in any efficient equilibrium of 1-GSP is therefore at least
∑
i∈N
pi(θ) ≥ 1
2

R(θ)− k∑
j=1
(βj − βj+1) · vj+1(θj+1)

 .
Our analysis also leads to a satisfactory contrast between the properties of 1-GSP
and the properties of any simplification of VCG: any simplification of VCG that does not
observe the value-generating click-through rates, and is Vickrey-preserving for all possible
choices of these click-through rates, must admit an efficient equilibrium with arbitrarily
low revenue.
Theorem 3. Let Mˆ be a simplification of the VCG mechanism that is Vickrey-preserving
on Ψ. Then, for every θ ∈ Ψ and every ǫ > 0, there exists an efficient equilibrium of Mˆ
with revenue at most ǫ.
Proof. Fix β ∈ Rn> and consider an arbitrary type profile θ ∈ Θβ ⊆ Ψ. Order the agents
such that v1(θ1) ≥ v2(θ2) ≥ · · · ≥ vn(θn).
The proof proceeds in two steps. First we will argue that for some c ≥ 0, every
δ > 0, and all i ∈ N , Xˆi must contain a message xδi corresponding to bids bij such that
bii = βi · vi(θi)+ c, bij ≤ βi · vi(θi)+ c+ δ for 1 ≤ j < i and bij ≤ c+ δ for i < j ≤ k. These
messages will then be used to construct an equilibrium with low revenue.
To show that the restricted message spaces Xˆi must contain messages as described
above, we show that these messages are required to reach the VCG outcome for a different
type profile θ′ ∈ Θβ′ ⊆ Ψ for a particular β′ ∈ Rn>. Denote by pi(θ′) the price of slot i for
type profile θ′. We know that for j ∈ {2, . . . , k}, β′j · vj(θ′j) = β′j−1 · vj(θ′j)− pj−1(θ′) (see,
e.g., [22]). Consider an arbitrary δ > 0. If we choose β′ such that β′1 − β′i and β′i+1 are
small enough, we can choose θ′ as above such that
pj(θ
′)− pi(θ′) ≤ δ for j < i and
pi(θ
′)− pj(θ′) ≥ βi · vi(θi)− δ for j > i.
A well-known property of the VCG outcome in the assignment problem is its envy-
freeness (see, e.g., [21]): denoting by bij the bid of agent i on slot j and by pj the price of
slot j, it must hold for every agent i that
bii − pi ≥ bij − pj for all j ∈ S.
For type profile θ′, we thus obtain
bij − bii ≤ pj(θ′)− pi(θ′) ≤ δ for j < i and
bii − bij ≥ pi(θ′)− pj(θ′) ≥ βi · vi(θi)− δ for j > i.
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Using messages xδi , we now construct an efficient equilibrium with low revenue. Clearly,
the allocation that assigns slot i to agent i is still efficient under message profile xδ. Fur-
thermore, for all j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, the VCG price of slot j under xδ goes to zero as δ goes
to zero. In particular, we can choose δ such that the overall revenue is at most ǫ. We
finally claim that there exists some δ′ > 0 such that xδ is an equilibrium for every δ with
δ′ > δ > 0. To see this, recall that βi · vi(θi) > βj · vi(θi) for j > i, so ui(xδ, θi) > βj · vi(θi)
for some small enough δ. If, on the other hand, agent i was assigned a slot j < i, his
payment would be at least βj ·vj(θj)− δ > βj ·vi(θi)− δ. This would leave him with utility
at most δ, which can be chosen to be smaller than ui(x
δ, θi).
It is worth noting that despite having a reasonably good lower bound on revenue, 1-
GSP does not quite succeed in circumventing Theorem 1: there exists a type profile for
which only the first slot generates a significant amount of VCG revenue, and an equilibrium
of 1-GSP for this type profile in which revenue is close to zero.
5 Combinatorial Auctions
Mechanisms for combinatorial auctions allocate items from a set G to the agents, i.e.,
Ω =
∏
i∈N 2
G such that for every o ∈ Ω and i, j ∈ N with i 6= j, oi ∩ oj = ∅. We make
the standard assumption that the empty set is valued at zero and that valuations satisfy
free disposal, i.e., for all i ∈ N , θi ∈ Θi, and o, o′ ∈ Ω, vi(o, θi) = 0 when oi = ∅ and
vi(o, θi) ≤ vi(o′, θi) when oi ⊆ o′i. The latter condition also implies that each agent is only
interested in the package he receives, and we sometimes abuse notation and write vi(C, θi)
for the valuation of agent i for any o ∈ Ω with oi = C. We further write k = |G| for the
number of items, W (o, x) =
∑
j∈N vj(o, xj) for the social welfare of outcome o ∈ Ω under
message profile x ∈ X, and Wmax (x) = maxo∈ΩW (o, x) for the maximum social welfare of
any outcome. Finally, for every agent i ∈ N , message xi ∈ X, and bundle of items B ⊆ G
we write xi(B) for agent i’s bid on bundle B.
The VCG mechanism makes it a dominant strategy for every agent to bid his true
valuation for every bundle of items. Since the number of such bundles is exponential in the
number of items, however, computational constraints might prevent agents from playing
this dominant strategy (even for a well-crafted bidding language [24, 19]). See Appendix G
for an explicit result on the need to communicate an exponential number of bids in the
VCG auction. In light of these results, and in light of the observation that simplifications
can help to isolate useful equilibria, it is interesting to ask which other (ex-post) equilibria
the VCG auction can have. Holzman and Monderer [15] showed that these equilibria are
precisely the projections of the true types to those subsets of the set of all bundles that
form a quasi-field. Let Σ ⊆ 2G be a set of bundles of items such that ∅ ∈ Σ. Σ is called a
quasi-field if it is closed under complementation and union of disjoint subsets, i.e., if
• B ∈ Σ implies Bc ∈ Σ, where Bc = G \B and
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• B,C ∈ Σ and B ∩ C implies B ∪ C ∈ Σ.
For a message xi ∈ Xi, write xΣi for the projection of a message xi ∈ Xi to Σ, i.e., for the
unique message such that for every bundle of items B ⊆ G,
xΣi (B) = max
B′∈Σ,B′⊆B
xi(B
′).
The characterization given by Holzman and Monderer is subject to the additional con-
straint of variable participation: a strategy profile s for a set N of agents is an equilibrium
of a VCG mechanism under variable participation if for every N ′ ⊆ N , the projection of s
to N ′ is an equilibrium of every VCG mechanism for N ′.
Theorem 4 (Holzman and Monderer [15]). Consider a VCG combinatorial auction with
a set N of agents and a set G of items. Then, a strategy profile s = (s1, . . . , sn) is an
ex-post equilibrium of this auction under variable participation if and only if there exists a
quasi-field Σ ⊆ 2G such that for every type profile θ and every agent i ∈ N , si(θi) = θΣi .
Intuitively, the social welfare obtained in these “bundling” equilibria decreases as the
set of bundles becomes smaller. A simple argument shows, for example, that welfare in the
bundling equilibrium for Σ, where |Σ| = 2m for some m ≤ k, can be smaller by a factor
of k/m than the maximum welfare. For this, consider a setting with k agents such that
each agent desires exactly one of the items, i.e., values this item at 1, and each item is
desired by exactly one of the agents. Clearly, maximum social welfare is k in this case.
On the other hand, since Σ is a quasi-field, it cannot contain more than m bundles that
are pairwise disjoint. Therefore, by assigning only bundles in Σ, one can obtain welfare at
most m.
In addition, welfare can also differ tremendously among quasi-fields of equal size, which
suggests an opportunity for simplification,
Proposition 4. Let G be a set of items, k = |G|, and m ≤ k. Then there exist quasi-fields
Σ,Σ′ ⊆ 2G with |Σ| = |Σ′| = 2m and a type profile θ such that
Wmax (θ
Σ)
Wmax (θΣ
′)
≥ m⌈m2/k⌉ .
Proof. Consider a partition of G into sets G1, . . . , Gm of size ⌈ km⌉ or ⌊ km⌋, and let Σ be
the closure of {G1, . . . , Gm} under complementation and union of disjoint sets. For every
i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, choose an arbitrary gi ∈ Gi, and define θ = (θ1, . . . , θm) such that for
every i with 1 ≤ i ≤ m, vi(X, θi) = 1 if gi ∈ X and vi(X, θi) = 0 otherwise. Clearly,
Wmax (θ
Σ) = m. Now consider a second partition of G into sets G′1, . . . , G
′
m of size ⌈ km⌉ or
⌊ k
m
⌋ such that G′j ⊇ { gi : (j − 1)⌊k/m⌋ + 1 ≤ i ≤ j⌊k/m⌋ }, and let Σ′ be the closure of
{G1, . . . , Gm} under complementation and union of disjoint sets. It is then easily verified
that Wmax (θ
Σ′) ≤ ⌈m/(k/m)⌉ = ⌈m2/k⌉, and the claim follows.
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Moreover, agents might disagree about the quality of the different bundling equilibria
of a given maximum size. In particular, the set of these equilibria might contain several
Pareto undominated equilibria, but no dominant strategy equilibrium. From the point of
view of equilibrium selection, this is the worst possible scenario.
Example 1. Let N = {1, 2, 3}, G = {A,B,C}, and consider a type profile θ = (θ1, θ2, θ3)
such that
v1(X, θ1) =


4 if {A,C} ⊆ X,
3 if A ∈ X and C /∈ X
1 otherwise;
v2(X, θ2) =
{
3 if {A,C} ⊆ X or {B,C} ⊆ X and
0 otherwise;
v3(X, θ3) =
{
1 if B ∈ X
0 otherwise.
Clearly, at least four bids are required to express θ1. Since a quasi-field on G must
contain both the empty set and G itself, there are four quasi-fields of size four or less:
Σ1 = {∅, {A}, {B,C}, {A,B,C}} Σ2 = {∅, {B}, {A,C}, {A,B,C}}
Σ3 = {∅, {C}, {A,B}, {A,B,C}} Σ4 = {∅, {A,B,C}}
For i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, write θi = (θΣi1 , θΣ
i
2 , θ
Σi
3 ) for the projection of θ to Σ
i. The following
is now easily verified. In the VCG outcome for θ1, agent 1 is assigned {A} at price 0 for
a utility of 3, and agent 2 is assigned {B,C} at price 1 for a utility of 2. In the VCG
outcome for θ2, agent 1 is assigned {A,C} at price 3 for a utility of 1, and agent 3 is
assigned {B} at price 0 for a utility of 1. Finally, in the VCG outcome for θ3 and θ4,
agent 1 is assigned {A,B,C} at price 3 for a utility of 1. The outcomes for θ1 and θ2 are
both Pareto undominated. Also observe that social welfare is greater for θ1, while θ2 yields
higher revenue.
Finally, the projection to a quasi-field can result in an equilibrium with revenue zero,
even if revenue in the dominant strategy equilibrium is strictly positive. This is illustrated
in the following example. It should be noted that this example, as well as the previous
one, can easily be generalized to arbitrary numbers of agents and items and a large range
of upper bounds on the size of the quasi-field.
Example 2. Let N = {1, 2, 3}, G = {A,B,C,D}, and consider a type profile θ =
(θ1, θ2, θ3) such that
v1(X, θ1) =
{
2 if {A,D} ⊆ X and
0 otherwise;
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v2(X, θ2) =


2 if {A,B} ⊆ X,
1 if B ∈ X and A /∈ X, and
0 otherwise;
v3(X, θ3) =
{
2 if C ∈ X, and
0 otherwise.
In the VCG outcome for θ, agent 1 is assigned {A,D} at price 1, agent 2 is assigned
{B} at price 0, and agent 3 is assigned {C} at price 0, for an overall revenue of 1. In
the VCG outcome for θΣ, on the other hand, where Σ = {∅, AB,CD,ABCD}, agent 2 is
assigned {A,B} and agent 3 is assigned {C,D}, both at price 0. Revenue is 0 as well.
In theory, one way to solve these problems is to simplify the mechanism, and artificially
restrict the set of bundles agents can bid on. Given a set Σ ⊆ 2G of bundles, call Σ-VCG
the simplification of the VCG mechanism obtained by restricting the message spaces to
Xˆi ⊆ Xi such that for every xˆi ∈ Xˆi and every bundle of items B ⊆ G,
xˆi(B) = max
B′∈Σ,B′⊆B
xˆi(B
′).
In other words, Σ-VCG allows agents to bid only on elements of Σ and derives bids for the
other bundles as the maximum bid on a contained bundle. It is easy to see that Σ-VCG is
maximal in range [23], i.e., that it maximizes social welfare over a subset of Ω. It follows
that for each agent, truthful projection onto Σ is a dominant strategy in Σ-VCG.
This shows that simplification can focus attention on a focal (truthful) equilibrium and
thus avoid equilibrium selection along a Pareto frontier. As Proposition 4 and the above
examples suggest, this can have a significant positive impact on both social welfare and
revenue. It does not tell us, of course, how Σ should be chosen in practice. One understood
approach for maximizing social welfare without any knowledge about the quality of different
outcomes, and without consideration to Σ being a quasi-field, is to partition G arbitrarily
into m sets of roughly equal size, where m is the largest number of bundles agents can bid
on. The welfare thus obtained is smaller than the maximum social welfare by a factor of
at most k/
√
m [16]. If additional knowledge is available, however, it may be possible to
improve the result substantially, as the above results comparing the outcomes for different
values of Σ show.
With that being said, there are (at least) two additional properties that are desirable for
a simplification: that Σ-VCG is tight, and that Σ is a quasi-field. Tightness ensures that no
additional equilibria are introduced as compared to the fully expressive VCG mechanism,
such that the quality of the worst equilibrium outcome of the simplification is no worse
than that of the original mechanism. This can remain important when Σ may still be
too large for agents to use its full projection, in which case agents would again have to
select from a large set of possible ex-post equilibria. By requiring that Σ is a quasi-field, in
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addition to being a dominant strategy equilibrium of Σ-VCG, truthful projection to Σ is
also an ex-post equilibrium of the fully expressive VCG mechanism, and thus stable against
unrestricted unilateral deviations. This ensures that agents do not experience regret, in
the sense of being prevented from sending a message they would want to send given the
messages sent by the other agents.
It turns out that these two requirements are actually equivalent, i.e., that Σ-VCG is
tight if and only if Σ is a quasi-field. The following result holds with respect to both Nash
equilibria and ex-post equilibria.
Theorem 5. Let Σ ⊆ 2G such that ∅ ∈ Σ. Then, Σ-VCG is a tight simplification if Σ is
a quasi-field, and this condition is also necessary if n ≥ 3.
Proof. For the direction from right to left, assume that Σ is a quasi-field. By Proposition 1
it suffices to show that Σ-VCG satisfies outcome closure. Fix valuation functions vj and
types θj for all j ∈ N , and consider an arbitrary agent i ∈ N . We claim that for every
xi ∈ Xi and every xˆ−i ∈ Xˆ−i,
ui((θ
Σ
i , xˆ−i), θi) ≥ ui((xi, xˆ−i), θi).
To see this, observe that there exists θˆ−i ∈ Θ−i such that θˆΣ−i = xˆ−i, and consider the type
profile (θi, θˆ−i). Holzman et al. [16] have shown that the projection of the true types to a
quasi-field Σ is an ex-post equilibrium of the (fully expressive) VCG mechanism. Thus, in
particular, θΣi is a best response to θˆ
Σ
−i = xˆ−i, which proves the claim.
For the direction from left to right, assume that Σ is not a quasi-field. Holzman et al.
[16] have shown that in this case, θΣ is not an ex-post equilibrium of the VCG mechanism.
On the other hand, θΣ is a dominant-strategy equilibrium of Σ-VCG, because Σ-VCG is
maximal in range. This shows that Σ-VCG is not tight.
Together with Theorem 4, this yields a characterization of the ex-post equilibria of
Σ-VCG for the case when Σ is a quasi-field.
Corollary 2. Let Σ be a quasi-field. Then, xˆ is an ex-post equilibrium of Σ-VCG under
variable participation if and only if xˆ = θΣ
′
for some quasi-field Σ′ ⊆ Σ.
Since a quasi-field of sizem can contain at most logm bundles that are pairwise disjoint,
insisting that a simplification be tight does come at a cost, decreasing the worst-case social
welfare in the truthful projection by an additional factor of up to
√
m/ logm. Still, as
discussed above, tightness brings other advantages to the simplified mechanism.
6 The Role of Information
Like most of the literature on sponsored search auctions, we have assumed that agents
have complete information about each others’ valuations for the different slots. It turns
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out that this assumption is crucial, and that the positive results for α-GSP do not extend
to incomplete information settings.
In particular, α-GSP admits an ex-post equilibrium only in very degenerate cases! This
complements a result of Gomes and Sweeney [13], who showed that α-GSP has an efficient
Bayes-Nash equilibrium on type space Θα if and only if α decreases sufficiently quickly.
Of course, ex-post Nash equilibrium is stronger than Bayes-Nash equilibrium, but on the
other hand our result precludes the existence of the former for a significantly larger type
space. The proof of the following theorem is given in Appendix D.
Theorem 6. Let α, β ∈ Rn>. Then, α-GSP has an efficient ex-post equilibrium on type
space Θβ if and only if n ≤ 2 or k ≤ 1, even if α = β.
The α-VCG mechanism does only slightly better: it has an ex-post equilibrium only
when it allows agents to bid truthfully (it is thus not a meaningful simplification, in that
the language is in this sense exact). The proof of this result is given in Appendix E.
Theorem 7. Let α, β ∈ Rn>. Then, α-VCG has an efficient ex-post equilibrium on type
space Θβ if and only if α = β, or n ≤ 2, or k ≤ 1.
These results indicate that simplification is not very useful in sponsored search auctions
without the assumption of complete information amongst bidders. Interestingly, simplifi-
cation is also not necessary in this case to preclude equilibria with bad properties, at least
in the special case of our model where the valuations are proportional to some (possibly
unknown) vector of value-generating click-through rates. In particular, payments in ev-
ery efficient ex-post equilibrium of the fully expressive VCG mechanism equal the VCG
payments. Moreover, truthful reporting is the only efficient ex-post equilibrium when the
number of agents is greater than the number of slots. The proof of this result is given in
Appendix F.
Proposition 5. Consider a VCG sponsored search auction with type profile θ ∈ Θα, and
assume that s = (s1, . . . , sn) is an efficient ex-post equilibrium. Then, for all i with 1 ≤ i ≤
k, the payment for slot i in the outcome for strategy profile s equals pi =
∑min(k,n−1)
j=i ((αj−
αj+1) · vj+1(θj+1)). Moreover, if n > k, then si(k, θi) = αk · vi(θi) for all i with 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
In considering simplifications for combinatorial auctions, we have adopted the standard
approach to assume incomplete information amongst agents, and in particular discussed
a family of simplifications of the VCG mechanism that offers a tradeoff between social
welfare and the amount of information agents have to communicate.
One may wonder why this tradeoff is necessary, and in how far it depends on the
amount of information agents have about each others’ types. It turns out that in the
complete information case a much smaller number of bids is enough to preserve an efficient
equilibrium, and in fact all equilibria, of the fully expressive VCG mechanism.
We show this using a simplification of the VCG mechanisms that we call n-VCG. The
message space of n-VCG consists of all bid vectors with at most n non-zero entries, where n
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is the number of agents. This reduces the number of bids elicited from each agent from 2k
to at most n, which can be exponentially smaller. Surprisingly, this simplification is both
tight and total, i.e., the set of Nash equilibria is completely unaffected by this restriction
of the message space. The proof of this result is given in Appendix H.
Theorem 8. The n-VCG mechanism is tight and total with respect to Nash equilibria.
7 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper we have studied simplifications of mechanisms obtained by restricting their
message space, and have found that they can be used to solve different kinds of equilibrium
selection problems that occur in practice. Direct revelation mechanisms typically have
several equilibria, which might be more or less desirable from the point of view of the
designer. Computational constraints might also imply that only a subset of the equilibria
of a mechanisms can actually be achieved, in which case agents might have to select among
several Pareto optimal equilibria. On the other hand, restricting the message space of a
mechanism often reduces the amount of social welfare that can be achieved theoretically,
and this seems to pivot on whether or not agents have complete information about each
others’ types. The choice between mechanisms with different degrees of expressiveness
therefore involves a tradeoff between a benefit of simplicity and a price of simplicity.
The price of simplicity can easily be quantified, for example, by the loss in social
welfare potentially incurred by a simplification, and has been studied in the context of
both sponsored search and combinatorial auctions. Abrams et al. [1] and Blumrosen et al.
[7], among others, have given bounds on the loss of social welfare incurred by α-GSP
for different classes of valuations that are not proportional to the click-through rates.
Christodoulou et al. [8] and Bhawalkar and Roughgarden [5] have studied the potential
loss in welfare when a set of items is sold through a simplification of the combinatorial
auction in which only bids that are additive in items are allowed. This bidding language
requires only a small number of bids, and welfare in equilibrium turns out to be smaller by
at most a logarithmic factor in the number of agents than the optimum achieved by the
fully expressive mechanism.
The benefit of simplicity is much harder to grasp as a concept. In this paper we
have argued that simplification can improve the economic properties of a mechanism by
precluding bad or promoting good equilibria. A remaining challenge is to understand the
benefit of simplicity in the context of simplified mechanisms for which the computation of
an equilibrium might be an intractable problem, like the ones of Christodoulou et al. and
Bhawalkar and Roughgarden described above. In contrast to the simplifications considered
in the present paper, these mechanisms may not be able to solve the computational or
informational problem of enabling agents to bid in a straightforward way. More generally,
it is far from obvious how “straightforwardness” of a mechanism should be measured, but
it seems reasonable to require that agents’ strategies can be computed in polynomial time.
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A Proof of Proposition 2
First we prove that α-GSP and α-VCG are tight on Θ. By Proposition 1 it suffices to show
that for every θ ∈ Θ, every i ∈ N , every xˆ−i ∈ Xˆ−i and every xi ∈ Xi there exists xˆi ∈ Xˆi
such that ui((xˆi, xˆ−i), θi) ≥ ui((xi, xˆ−i), θ). Denote the outcome of GSP resp. VCG on
(xi, xˆ−i) by o. For l 6= i let bl ∈ R≥0 be such that xˆl = (α1 · bl, . . . , αk · bl). Let bi be
the oi-th highest value among the bl’s. Then in the outcome o
′ of α-GSP and α-VCG on
(xˆi, xˆ−i) we have o
′
i = oi and, thus, vi(o
′
i, θi) = vi(oi, θi). Since i’s payment pi(oi) and pi(o
′
i)
in GSP resp. VCG and α-GSP resp. α-VCG only depends on xˆ−i and is therefore the same,
we conclude that ui((xˆi, xˆ−i), θi) ≥ ui((xi, xˆ−i), θ).
Next we show that α-GSP and α-VCG have positive revenue on Θ> for n, k ≥ 2.
Suppose xˆ is a NE of α-GSP resp. α-VCG. For i ∈ N let bi ∈ R≥0 be such that xˆi =
(α1 · bi, . . . , αk · bi). Renumber the agents by non-increasing bi. The revenue achieved by
α-GSP resp. α-VCG is
∑
i αi · bi+1 resp.
∑
i
∑
j>i(αj−1−αj) · bj , where the sums are over
all i, j ≤ min(n, k) with bi, bj > 0. Hence in both, α-GSP and α-VCG, we can only have
zero revenue if bi = 0 for all i > 1. In this case all agents but the first remain unassigned
and any agent i > 1 can bid 0 < b′i < b1 to be assigned slot 2 at price 0. Since θi ∈ Θ>i we
have vi(2, θi) > 0 and, thus, agent i’s utility would strictly increase. We conclude that in
both, α-GSP and α-VCG, the revenue associated with xˆ must be strictly positive.
Finally, we show that α-GSP and α-VCG are Vickrey compatible on Θα. For this denote
the outcome and payments computed by VCG for the true types θ ∈ Θα by o and p. Recall
that i < j implies that pi > pj. We have to argue that there are NE xˆ ∈ Xˆ of α-GSP and
α-VCG in which the outcome and payments are identical to o and p.
For α-GSP we construct xˆ ∈ Xˆ as follows: 1. Renumber the agents by the slot they
are assigned to in o. 2. Set b1 = v1(1, θ1) and for i > 1 set bi = α
−1
i−1 · p(i− 1). 3. For all i
let xˆi = (α1 · bi, . . . , αk · bi). We have chosen xˆ ∈ Xˆ such that the outcome and payments
computed by α-GSP on xˆ are identical to o and p. To see that xˆ is a NE of α-GSP observe
that if agent i deviates from xˆ to win slot j, then the price p′′(j) that he would have to pay
for slot j is at least as large as the price p′(j) = p(j) of slot j in the outcome computed by
α-GSP resp. VCG on xˆ resp. θ. That is, if i would strictly benefit from the deviation that
gives him slot j, then we would have vi(j, θi)− p(j) ≥ vi(j, θi)− p′′(j) > vi(i, θi)− p′(i) =
vi(i, θi)−p(i). But this would contradict the fact that the outcome and payments computed
by VCG are envy free [21].
For α-VCG we can use xˆ = θ ∈ Xˆ. Applying α-VCG to xˆ gives, of course, the same
assignment and payments as applying VCG to θ. To see that xˆ is a NE of α-VCG observe
that any beneficial deviation from xˆ in α-VCG would also be a beneficial deviation from
θ in VCG and, thus, would contradict the fact that truthtelling is a dominant strategy of
VCG.
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B Proof of Proposition 3
Fix α, β ∈ Rn> and θ ∈ Θβ. Renumber the agents so that v1(θ1) ≥ v2(θ2) ≥ · · · ≥ vn(θn).
Efficiency requires that agent i win position i. To get the Vickrey prices pi(θ) for all
slots i it is necessary that the equilibrium bid by agent i ∈ {2, . . . ,min(n, k + 1)} be
bi(θ) = pi−1(θ)/αi−1. Take b1(θ) = α1 · v1(θ1) and bi(θ) = 0 for i > min(n, k + 1).
First suppose that the sequence {pj/αj}j is not decreasing, e.g., because pi(θ)/αi <
pi+1(θ)/αi+1. It follows that bi+1(θ) = pi(θ)/αi < pi+1(θ)/αi + 1 = bi+2(θ) and, thus, the
bids are not ranked in the order required for efficiency.
Next suppose that the sequence {pj/αj}j is decreasing. In this case the bids are ranked
in the correct order. For a contradiction suppose that some agent j could strictly benefit
from a deviation to θ′ = (θ1, . . . , θj−1, θ
′
j , θj+1, . . . , θn). Suppose that given θ
′ agent j is
assigned slot l at price pl(θ
′). Since agent j strictly benefits from the deviation we must
have that βl · vj(θj) − pl(θ′) > βj · vj(θ) − pj(θ). If l < j, then the price that agent
j faces for slot l is at least pl(θ
′) ≥ αl · pl−1(θ)/αl−1 > αl · pl(θ)/αl = pl(θ). If l > j,
then the price that agent j faces for slot l is exactly pl(θ
′) = pl(θ). We conclude that
βl · vj(θj) − pl(θ) ≥ βl · vj(θj) − pl(θ′) > βj · vj(θj) − pj(θ). But this contradicts the envy
freeness of the VCG assignment and payments (see, e.g., [21]).
C Counterexample for the VCG Mechanism
Let α ∈ Rn> be such that α1 = 1, α2 = 0.5, and α3 = 0.4, and let β ∈ Rn> be such that
β1 = 1, β2 = 0.9, and β3 = 0.8. Let θ ∈ Θβ be such that v1(θ1) = 30, v2(θ2) = 20,
v3(θ3) = 10, and vi(θi) = 0 if i > 3. In the VCG outcome, slot 1 is assigned to agent 1
at price p1(θ) = (β1 − β2) · v2(θ2) + (β2 − β3) · v3(θ3) = 3, slot 2 to agent 2 at p2(θ) =
(β2−β3)·v3(θ3) = 1, and slot 3 to agent 3 at p3(θ) = 0. Now assume that the same outcome
is obtained in α-VCG, and denote by b ∈ Rn a bid profile that leads to this outcome. Since
both VCG and α-VCG are efficient, it must hold that b1 ≥ b2 ≥ b3. To get the same prices
as in the VCG outcome, we must further have that b2 = (β1 − β2)/(α1 − α2) · v2(θ2) = 4
and b3 = (β2 − β3)/(α2 − α3) · v3(θ3) = 10. Thus, b2 < b3, which gives a contradiction.
D Proof of Theorem 6
If n = 1 or k = 1, strategies si with si(θi) = β1/α1 · vi(θi) ensure that the agent with the
highest valuation is assigned the first slot at a price equal to the second-highest valuation.
It is easy to see that this is efficient and constitutes an ex-post equilibrium.
Now consider the case where n = 2 and k ≥ 2. We claim that si(θi) = (β1−β2)/α1·vi(θi)
for i ∈ {1, 2} is the unique efficient ex-post equilibrium in this case. To see this, observe
24
that s1 is an equilibrium strategy if and only if for all θ1 ∈ Θ1 and θ2 ∈ Θ2,
β1 · v2(θ2)− α1 · s1(θ1) ≥ β2 · v2(θ2) if agent 2 is assigned the first slot, and
β1 · v2(θ2)− α1 · s1(θ1) ≤ β2 · v2(θ2) if agent 2 is assigned the second slot.
For s1 to be part of an efficient equilibrium, the first inequality has to hold if v2(θ2) =
v1(θ1) + ǫ for any ǫ > 0, and the second inequality has to hold if v2(θ2) = v1(θ1) − ǫ for
any ǫ > 0. By rearranging, we get that for every θ1 ∈ Θ1 and every ǫ > 0,
s1(θ1) ≤ β1 − β2
α1
· (v1(θ1) + ǫ) and s1(θ1) ≥ β1 − β2
α1
· (v1(θ1)− ǫ).
Since analogous conditions have to hold for s2, the claim follows.
Finally consider the case where n ≥ 3 and k ≥ 2, and assume for contradiction that s is
an efficient ex-post equilibrium. Observe that s must remain an equilibrium if we restrict
the types in such a way that vℓ(θℓ) > 0 if ℓ ∈ {1, 2} and vℓ(θℓ) = 0 otherwise. Strategies
s1 and s2 thus have to be of the form described above, i.e., si(θi) = (β1 − β2)/α1 · vi(θi)
for i ∈ {1, 2}. Similarly, s remains an equilibrium if we restrict the valuations such that
vℓ(θℓ) > 0 if ℓ = 3 and vℓ(θℓ) = 0 otherwise. It follows that s3(θ3) > 0 if v3(θ3) > 0. Let
v1(θ1) = v2(θ2) = v for some v > 0, choose θ3 such that 0 < v3(θ3) < (β1−β2)/α1 ·v, and let
vℓ(θℓ) = 0 for ℓ > 3. Thus s1(θ1) = (β1−β2)/α1 ·v, s2(θ2) = (β1−β2)/α1 ·v, and sℓ(θℓ) = 0
for ℓ > 3. It further holds that v3(θ3) < v, because β1 > β2 and α1 = 1. We may now
assume without loss of generality that for this bid profile, α-GSP assigns slot 1 to agent 1,
slot 2 to agent 2, and slot 3 to agent 3; the case where slot 1 is assigned to agent 2 and
slot 2 to agent 1 is symmetric. Agent 2 thus obtains utility u2 = β2 ·v−s3(θ3) < β2 ·v. If he
changed his bid to b′2 > b2, he would be assigned slot 1 at price p
′
1 = α1 · (β1−β2)/α1 · v =
(β1 − β2) · v, and obtain utility u′2 = β1 · v − p′1 = β1 · v − (β1 − β2) · v = β2 · v > u2. This
contradicts the assumption that s is an equilibrium.
E Proof of Theorem 7
If α = β, agent i can bid truthfully on all slots by letting si(θi) = vi(θi). If n = 1 or
k = 1, only one slot will be assigned, and agent i can bid truthfully on this slot by letting
si(θi) = β1/α1 · vi(θi). In both cases, truthful bidding constitutes an efficient dominant
strategy equilibrium and, a fortiori, an efficient ex-post equilibrium.
Now consider the case where n = 2 and k ≥ 2. We claim that strategy profile s where
si(θi) = (β1−β2)/(α1 −α2) · vi(θi) for i ∈ {1, 2} is the unique efficient ex-post equilibrium
in this case. To see this, observe that s1 is an equilibrium strategy if and only if for all
θ1 ∈ Θ1 and θ2 ∈ Θ2,
β1 · v2(θ2)− (α1 − α2) · s1(θ1) ≥ β2 · v2(θ2) if agent 2 is assigned the first slot, and
β1 · v2(θ2)− (α1 − α2) · s1(θ1) ≤ β2 · v2(θ2) if agent 2 is assigned the second slot.
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For s1 to be part of an efficient equilibrium, the first inequality has to hold if v2(θ2) =
v1(θ1) + ǫ for any ǫ > 0, and the second inequality has to hold if v2(θ2) = v1(θ1) − ǫ for
any ǫ > 0. By rearranging, we get that for every θ1 ∈ Θ1 and every ǫ > 0,
s1(θ1) ≤ β1 − β2
α1 − α2 · (v1(θ1) + ǫ) and s1(θ1) ≥
β1 − β2
α1 − α2 · (v1(θ1)− ǫ).
Since analogous conditions have to hold for s2, the claim follows.
Finally consider the case where n ≥ 3, k ≥ 2, and α 6= β, and assume for contradiction
that s is an efficient ex-post equilibrium. We first claim that s is symmetric. For a
contradiction assume that there exist agents i and j such that si 6= sj. Observe that s
must remain an equilibrium if we restrict the valuations of all other agents such that in
every efficient assignment, agents i and j are assigned the last two slots. This means,
however, that si and sj induce an efficient ex-post equilibrium for the case where n = 2
and k ≥ 2. By assumption, this equilibrium is asymmetric, contradicting an observation
we have made in the previous paragraph.
Since s is symmetric, there must exist a function s∗ : R→ R such that for every i ∈ N
and every θi ∈ Θi, si(θi) = s∗(vi(θi)). It is not hard to see that s∗(v) > 0 if v > 0 and
s∗(v) = 0 if v = 0. Since by convention α1 = β1 = 1 and αk+1 = βk+1 = 0, and since
αj 6= βj for some j < k, there must further exist i > 1 such that (i) αj −αj+1 ≤ βj − βj+1
for all j < i and αi − αi+1 > βi − βi+1, or (ii) αj − αj+1 ≥ βj − βj+1 for all j < i and
αi − αi+1 < βi − βi+1. Since the two cases are symmetric, it suffices to consider the first
one.
Consider an arbitrary v > 0. We distinguish two cases.
First assume that s∗(v) > (βi − βi+1)/(αi − αi+1) · v. Let vℓ(θℓ) = v for ℓ ≤ i + 1
and vℓ(θℓ) = 0 for ℓ > i + 1. It then holds that sℓ(θℓ) = s∗(v) > 0 for ℓ ≤ i + 1 and
sℓ(θℓ) = s∗(0) = 0 for ℓ > i+1. Assume without loss of generality that for this bid profile,
α-VCG assigns slot ℓ to agent ℓ for ℓ ≤ i+1, and that the remaining agents are not assigned
a slot. The utility of agent i in this case is ui = βi · v− pi(θ) = βi · v− (αi−αi+1) · s∗(v). If
he changed his bid to b with 0 < b < s∗(v), he would be assigned slot i+ 1 at price 0 and
obtain utility βi+1 · v = βi+1 · v+(αi−αi+1) · s∗(v)− pi > βi · v− pi = ui. This contradicts
the assumption that s is an equilibrium.
Now assume that s∗(v) ≤ (βi−βi+1)/(αi−αi+1)·v, and observe that in this case s∗(v) <
v. Let vℓ(θℓ) = v for ℓ ≤ i and vℓ(θℓ) = 0 for ℓ > i. It then holds that sℓ(θℓ) = s∗(v) > 0
for ℓ ≤ i and sℓ(θℓ) = s∗(0) = 0 for ℓ > i. Assume without loss of generality that for this
bid profile, α-VCG assigns slot ℓ to agent ℓ for ℓ ≤ i, and that the remaining agents are not
assigned a slot. The utility of agent i under this assignment is ui = βi ·v−pi(θ) = βi ·v. If he
changed his bid to b > s∗(v), he would be assigned slot 1 at price
∑
j<i(αj−αj+1)·s∗(v) and
obtain utility u′i = β1 ·v−
∑
j<i(αj−αj+1) ·s∗(v) > β1 ·v−
∑
j<i(βj−βj+1) ·v = βi ·v = ui.
This again contradicts the assumption that s is an equilibrium.
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F Proof of Proposition 5
Consider two agents i, i′ ∈ N and two consecutive slots j and j + 1. Fix θi. Since the
strategy si of agent i does not depend on the types of the other agents, we can choose the
types of the agents in N \ {i, i′} in such a way that an efficient outcome assigns slot j to
agents i and slot j + 1 to agent i′, or vice versa. Doing so also fixes the bids of all agents
in N \ {i, i′}, and thus the payment pj+1 associated with slot j + 1.
For si to be part of an ex-post equilibrium it must hold that
αj · vi′(θi′)− (si(j, θi)− si(j + 1, θi))− pj+1 ≥ αj+1 · vi′(θi′)− pj+1
if agent i′ is assigned slot j, and
αj+1 · vi′(θi′)− pj+1 ≥ αj · vi′(θi′)− (si(j, θi)− si(j + 1, θi))− pj+1
if agent i′ is assigned slot j + 1. For the equilibrium to be efficient the first inequality
must hold if vi′(θi′) = vi(θi) + ǫ for any ǫ > 0, and the second inequality must hold if
vi′(θi′) = vi(θi)−ǫ for any ǫ > 0. By substituting vi′(θi′) accordingly in the two inequalities
and considering arbitrarily small ǫ > 0 we obtain
si(j, θi) = (αj − αj+1) · vi(θi) + si(j + 1, θi).
Since this equality must hold for every agent, the payment for slot i equals
pi =
min(k,n−1)∑
j=i
(sj+1(j, θj+1)− sj+1(j + 1, θj+1)) =
min(k,n−1)∑
j=i
((αj − αj+1) · vj+1(θj+1)),
which is exactly the VCG payment for that slot.
The stronger claim for n > k follows by setting αk+1 = 0 and si(k + 1, θi) = 0, and
deriving strategies inductively from slot k through 1 according to the above equality.
G Efficiency Requires an Exponential Number of Bids
Proposition 6. Consider a VCG combinatorial auction with a set G of items, |G| ≥ 3,
and a set N of agents, |N | ≥ 2, and assume that s = (s1, . . . , sn) is an efficient ex-post
equilibrium. Then there exists a type profile θ = (θ1, . . . , θn) such that for some agent i ∈ N
and every pair of bundles X,Y ∈ 2G such that X ⊂ Y , si(X, θi) 6= si(Y, θi).
Proof. We can assume without loss of generality that |N | = 2. Otherwise, for i > 2, we
could choose θi such that vi(X, θi) = 0 for every X ∈ 2G, which by efficiency of s would
immediately imply that si(X, θi) = 0 for all X ⊆ 2G.
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Choose θ1 such that v1(X, θ1) 6= v1(Y, θ1) for all X,Y ∈ 2G with X ⊂ Y . Further
assume for contradiction that there exist X,Y ∈ 2G such that X ⊂ Y and s1(X, θ1) =
s1(Y, θ1). Observe that X
c ⊃ Y c, and that v1(Y, θ1) > v1(X, θ1) by assumption. We can
now choose θ2 such that v2(X
c, θ2) > v2(Y
c, θ2) and v1(Y, θ1) + v2(Y
c, θ2) > v1(X, θ1) +
v2(X
c, θ2). By choosing v2(Y
c, θ2) large enough we can further ensure that the only efficient
outcome assigns bundle Y to agent 1 and bundle Y C to agent 2. Now, since s1(X, θ1) =
s1(Y, θ1) and v2(X
c, θ2) > v2(Y
c, θ2), s2 can only be a best response to s1 if the VCG
mechanism assigns X to agent 1 and Xc to agent 2. This contradicts efficiency of s.
H Proof of Theorem 8
We first prove that n-VCG is tight. By Proposition 1 it suffices to show that n-VCG
satisfies outcome closure. Fix valuations vj and types θj for all j ∈ N , and consider an
arbitrary agent i ∈ N. We claim that for every xi ∈ Xi and every xˆ−i ∈ Xˆ−i, there exists
xˆi ∈ Xˆi such that
ui((xˆi, xˆ−i), θi) ≥ ui((xi, xˆ−i), θi).
Denote the outcome of VCG for (xi, xˆ−i) by o. Let xˆi(C) = xi(C) for C = oi and let
xˆi(C) = 0 otherwise. We know that o achieves the same social welfare under (xˆi, xˆ−i)
as under (xi, xˆ−i). Since xˆi(C) ≤ xi(C) for all C, we also know that the social welfare
achieved by any outcome o′ 6= o under (xˆi, xˆ−i) is weakly smaller than the social welfare
achieved by o under (xˆi, xˆ−i). Hence agent i gets the same bundle of items, namely oi,
under (xˆi, xˆ−i) and (xi, xˆ−i). Since i’s payment depends only on xˆ−i we conclude that
ui((xˆi, xˆ−i), θi) ≥ ui((xi, xˆ−i), θi).
Now we turn to totality. To this end, we consider a property of a simplification we call
outcome reducibility, which requires that there exists a way of mapping messages of the
original mechanism to messages of the simplification such that (i) outcomes and payoffs
are preserved, and such that (ii) for every agent and every choice of messages for the other
agents, the maximum utility the agent can obtain, by choosing any action, is at least as high
as the utility he can obtain by choosing from his restricted message set when the messages
of the other agents have been mapped to their restricted message sets. More formally,
a simplification (N, Xˆ, fˆ , pˆ) of a mechanism (N,X, f, p) satisfies outcome reducibility if
there exists a mapping h : X → Xˆ with the following properties: (i) for every x ∈ X,
f(x) = f(h(x)) and p(x) = p(h(x)); (ii) for every i ∈ N , every x ∈ X, and every xˆ′i ∈ Xˆi,
there exists x′i ∈ Xi such that ui((x′i, x−i), θi) ≥ ui((xˆ′i, h−i(x)), θi). This turns out to be
sufficient for totality, but only with respect to Nash equilibria.
Lemma 1. Every simplification that satisfies outcome reducibility is total with respect to
Nash equilibria.
Proof. Fix θ ∈ Θ. Consider a mechanism M = (N,X, f, p), a simplification Mˆ =
(N, Xˆ, fˆ , pˆ) that has property P2, and a Nash equilibrium x of M . Assume for con-
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tradiction that h(x) ∈ Xˆ is not a Nash equilibrium of Mˆ . Then, for some i ∈ N , there
exists xˆ′i ∈ Xˆi such that ui((xˆ′i, h−i(x)), θi) > ui(h(x), θi). Since Mˆ has property P2,
there further exists x′i ∈ Xi such that ui((x′i, x−i), θi) ≥ ui((xˆ′i, h−i(x)), θi). It follows that
ui((x
′
i, x−i), θi) > ui(h(x), θi) = ui(x, θi), which contradicts the assumption that x is a
Nash equilibrium of M .
By Lemma 1 it now suffices to show that n-VCG satisfies outcome reducibility. We
compute h(x) as follows: 1. Denote the outcome of VCG for x by o. For all agents i and
B = oi mark xi(B). 2. For each agent j let o
′ denote the outcome of VCG if j was removed.
For each such outcome o′, all agents i, and B = o′i mark xi(B). 3. For all agents i and all
bundles B set xˆi(B) = xi(B) if xi(B) was marked and xˆi(B) = 0 otherwise.
To (i): The outcome that maximizes welfare under x also maximizes welfare under h(x)
and the welfare achieved by this outcome is the same under x and h(x). Similarly, for each
agent i, the welfare achieved by the outcome that maximizes welfare if agent i is removed
is the same under x and h(x). Hence the outcomes f(h(x)) and f(x) and the prices p(h(x))
and p(x) for h(x) and x are the same.
To (ii): Consider xˆ′i. Denote the outcome computed by VCG for (xˆ
′
i, h−i(x)) by oˆ.
We claim that there exists x′i such that in the outcome o computed by VCG for (x
′
i, x−i)
we have oi = oˆi. Let x
′
i(C) = Wmax (xˆ
′
i, h−i(x)) + ǫ for C = oi and some ǫ > 0 and let
x′i(C) = 0 otherwise. If oi = oˆi, then the social welfare Wmax (x
′
i, x−i) of the outcome
of VCG for (x′i, x−i) is at least Wmax (xˆ
′
i, h−i(x)) + ǫ. Otherwise, the social welfare is
Wmax (x
′
i, x−i) = Wmax (0, x−i) = Wmax (0, h−i(x)) ≤ Wmax (xˆ′i, h−i(x)) and, thus, strictly
smaller. We conclude that oi = oˆi.
We further claim that the price pi(oi) that agent i has to pay for oi under (x
′
i, x−i) is
smaller/equal to the price pˆi(oi) that agent i has to pay for oi under (xˆ
′
i, h−i(x)). Since
Wmax (0, x−i) = Wmax (0, h−i(x)) and W
oi
max
(0, x−i) ≥ W oimax (0, h−i(x)), where W oimax (. . . )
denotes the maximal social welfare for the corresponding message profile if all items in oi
are removed from the set of items, we have that pi(oi) = Wmax (0, x−i) −W oimax (0, x−i) ≤
Wmax (0, h−i(x)) −W oimax (0, h−i(x)) = pˆi(oi).
We conclude that ui((x
′
i, x−i), θi) ≥ ui((xˆ′i, h−i(x)), θi).
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